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Abstract 
History that is ignored is very vengeful. The paper tests the claim by the central bank governor, who presided over 
hyperinflation in 2004-2008, that inflation was mainly driven by speculation and shadow printing of money in the 
financial system. Mutually reinforcing corporate incest manifesting in the real estate sector, banking sector, parallel 
foreign exchange market and the Zimbabwe stock exchange underpinned hyperinflation dynamics before and 
during his term of office. Speculative activities in these sectors drove money supply growth, parallel exchange rate 
premium and so, inflation. Existing studies have not tested his hypothesis and summarily have dismissed it arguing 
that hyperinflation was a doing of the central bank’s monetary indiscipline. Using ARDL models we establish long 
run relationships amongst the building materials price index, consumer price index, parallel exchange rate and 
broad money supply. We also find bidirectional causality between money supply and the consumer price index as 
well as between the building materials price index and money supply. We find causation running from building 
materials index to consumer price index; from parallel exchange rate to consumer price index; and from broad 
money to parallel exchange rate. Our findings, to a considerable extent, not only confirm the governor’s argument, 
but also confirm existing narratives of monetary indiscipline in explaining hyperinflation. 
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1. Introduction 
Zimbabwe has continued to fall at the stumbling block, hyperinflation. Reasons for hyperinflation are varied and 
literature has suggested that monetary indiscipline is the bedrock of inflation dynamics in Zimbabwe. Excessive 
government consumptive spending financed through printing of money is the main driver. Literature also concedes 
that the parallel exchange rate played an important role in inflation expectations formation (Kararach & Otieno, 
2016; McIndoe-Calder, 2018). A number of works have used Quantity Theory of Money (QTM) based 
explanations to argue that inflation has been a monetary phenomenon mostly. However, in a context where they 
find bidirectional causality they still ignore that and invoke QTM based explanations. It is important to note that 
the QTM models assumes unidirectional causality from money supply to inflation. The moment bidirectional 
causality is established, QTM based explanations become problematic. The former governor of the central bank, 
Gideon Gono, claimed that scholars had turned a blind eye to the multifaceted nature of inflation drivers in 
Zimbabwe during his tenure. His argument suggested that inflation drivers were substantially driven by market 
indiscipline in addition to supply-side shocks because of failing agriculture after the chaotic land reform, 
underutilization of capacity, and irrational exuberance in financial, parallel foreign exchange and Zimbabwe stock 
markets (Gono, 2008). Corporate incest in the financial system saw shadow printing of money and abuse of quasi-
fiscal facilities provided by the central bank (Gono, 2008). The verdict in academic circles, however, has remained 
resolute that it was monetary indiscipline by the central bank that underpinned inflation, of which an excellent 
review of hyperinflation in Zimbabwe making this point clearly is Kararach & Otieno (2016). Chances of success 
in appealing against this verdict are considered non-existent. Some thinkers have argued that rent seeking and 
political manipulation of the central bank in the age of Mugabeism was, and continues to be, the fundamental 
problem (Dawson & Kelsall, 2012; Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2015). The game of political survival therefore dictated 
pillaging of the central bank and the end result was hyperinflation. The pillaging of the central bank also led to 
hysteria in parallel foreign exchange market and the Zimbabwe Stock Exchange. The collapse of aggregate supply, 
frequent droughts, persistent fuel shortages and ailing critical state-owned enterprises such as the power utility and 
railways largely because of militarization (Rupiya, 2011) were also considered important contributors. 
Setting aside data quality and availability issues, the paper tests the central bank governor’s claim that it was 
the trilateral relationship amongst parallel foreign exchange market, real estate market, and stock market that 
underpinned the hyperinflation inferno. We demonstrate in the paper that to a considerable extent the governor’s 
claims have substance even though that does not confute the verdict that monetary indiscipline was also a major 
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factor in the dynamics. We find, inflation inertia to be the most influential factor in the evolution of inflation. This 
suggests existence of adverse adaptive inflation expectations. This factor has not been highlighted in much of the 
discourses making rounds. We demonstrate existence of bidirectional causality between the real estate market 
price dynamics and broad money and between broad money and the consumer price index. We also show a 
unidirectional causal influence from the real estate market price dynamics to the consumer price index. Taken 
together, the pieces seem to demonstrate that governor’s claim cannot be summarily dismissed. While the verdict 
that monetary indiscipline was the bedrock of hyperinflation might not be successfully appealed against in the 
constitutional court of academic opinion, new accomplices have also been found adding to this multifaceted 
inferno. The remainder of this section sketches the background and the research problem. Section 2 presents 
arguments from literature. Section 3 presents methods and data and section 4 presents results. Section five 
concludes the paper. 
 
1.1 Background 
The chaotic land reform (1999-2002) led to the collapse of export performance and foreign currency earning 
capacity (Chitiga & Mabugu, 2008; Sachikonye, 2003). It also led to sustained collapse of aggregate supply (AS) 
and excessive informalization of the economy, with GDP falling by approximately 40% between 2000 and 2008, 
and an increase in unemployment to over 70% (Noko, 2011). Similarly, under conditions of escalating parallel 
exchange rate premium and reliance on food imports, it is evident that supply side shocks emanating from the 
foreign exchange market, albeit parallel, played an important role of increasing the role of imported inflation in 
the evolution of inflation dynamics in Zimbabwe (Kararach & Otieno, 2016). Kararach & Otieno (2016) find 
evidence of sustained long run depreciation of the real parallel exchange rate between 1998 and 2008, evidence 
which points to an ever increasing role of imported inflation in the evolution of inflation dynamics in Zimbabwe 
given the importance of imports in filling the gap created by a collapse in domestic aggregate supply. The collapse 
of export performance created severe foreign currency shortages, which motivated government to institute foreign 
currency allocation mechanisms as well as compulsory export earning surrender requirements (Kiguel, Lizondo, 
& O'Connell, 1997; Makochekanwa, 2007b). Government had to find ways of sourcing foreign currency for critical 
operations. 
Mawowa & Matongo (2010) directly link the printing of money by the central bank to buy highly scarce 
foreign currency to the escalation of parallel market exchange rates in Zimbabwe. The burgeoning of cross border 
informal trade and remittances became a very important foreign currency supply for informal currency trade. So 
great has been this roadside currency trade that some important central business district sites have acquired for 
themselves the names of Bretton-Woods institutions such as the World Bank and the IMF. Excessive growth of 
nominal monetary balances not backed by production also occurred as speculative and arbitrage activities took the 
form of casino economy practices: foreign currency holders exchanged it at exorbitantly high parallel market 
exchange rate premium over the official exchange rate, and immediately used the real time gross settlement money 
balances to buy foreign currency at even higher premiums (Gukurume, 2010; Gukurume, 2015). This arbitrage-
like speculative behavior became known as the burning of money (Gono, 2008; Kararach & Otieno, 2016) and up 
to this day this practice continues. In all likelihood, the burning of money drove parallel exchange rate premiums 
and parallel exchange rate premium drove money supply growth. The proceeds from parallel foreign currency 
dealing were also used to speculate in the real estate sector and on the Zimbabwe Stock Exchange (Gono, 2008). 
In the period 1998 to 2003 asset management companies, with no proper regulatory and supervisory framework, 
mushroomed everywhere and they became the engines of the casino economy (Fundira, 2007; Gono, 2008).  
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Figure 1: Evolution of consumer price index, building materials index, broad money and parallel exchange rate 
Source: Plotted using Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe and Zimbabwe Statistical Agency data 
Figure 1 show a sustained increase in the building materials price index, consumer price index, parallel 
exchange rate and broad money. The central bank engaged in several quasi-fiscal activities between 2004 and 2008 
which injected a lot of liquidity in the economy. Quasi-fiscal activities reached a high of 75% of GDP according 
to one estimate (Muñoz, 2007). These interventions included the trouble bank fund to rescue banks that were 
collapsing because of misgovernance, corruption and departure from the core business or simply greed (Fundira, 
2007; Gono, 2008; Tembo, 2016), agricultural sector productivity enhancement facility, productive sector facility, 
farm mechanization program, basic commodities supply side intervention, winter crops facility, dam construction 
and irrigation rehabilitation fund. The repayment of these facilities was not always good and the facilities we also 
abused, beneficiaries channeling the funds into speculative trade. Thus much of the injected liquidity was not 
successfully mopped up. This means that the initial impulse for wild price dynamics always had its roots in good 
intentioned quasi-fiscal interventions (Figure 1). 
In the period under study, Zimbabwe initially maintained a fixed exchange rate between 1998 and 2003. In 
2004, a foreign exchange auction system was instituted to gradually introduce market forces in the allocation of 
foreign currency and so, to determine the exchange rate (Gono, 2008). The exchange rate management system was 
in fact a dual one because there was also a favourable exchange rate for the diaspora to attract remittances. Because 
of weak foreign currency generating capacity in the economy, it soon turned out to be a fixed exchange rate. 
Stringent export proceeds retention mechanisms were put in place to build up short term foreign currency reserves. 
Because of this repressive exchange rate management system, foreign currency earners ended up channeling their 
proceeds to the parallel market to earn better returns. 
Government also instituted the National Incomes and Pricing Commission as part of a social contract to 
prevent indexation of wages and pricing to inflation, let alone to the parallel exchange rate (Gono, 2008). This 
initiative, while useful, did not manage to stop the galloping price level. 
 
1.2. Problem statement 
An untested claim of the then central bank governor, Gideon Gono, is that the real estate market alongside the 
stock exchange market and the parallel foreign currency market played a significant role in the evolution of 
inflation dynamics in Zimbabwe (Gono, 2008). Gono’s thesis is that the phenomenon of shadow printing of money 
in the real estate – stock market – private banking sector complex has not been evaluated in existing scholarship 
in terms of its contribution to hyperinflation. The said shadow printing of money in the private banking in search 
of returns above the inflation rate resulted in money supply growing at a much faster rate than the price level itself. 
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In one instance a whistle blower in one commercial bank informed the central bank that one of his/her bank’s 
clients was bribing some bank official to issue fraudulent bank cheques against non-existent bank balances. Once 
the central bank was alerted, setting a trap in the clearing system, discovered “a staggering total of ZWD 60 
hexillion … in fraudulent cheques …. Which had become actual credit balances”, a cheque scam of mega 
proportions (Gono 2008, 80). What we have here is an example of shadow printing of money: the ZWD 60 
hexillion was 6 billion times larger than official currency in circulation and 55 times larger than total quasi-fiscal 
operations of the central bank that were valued at ZWD 1.1 hexillion. These fraudulent cheques were channeled 
into real estate and stock market trading, thus leading to stock prices for some counters gaining no less than 2 
million percent in a single day. The Chief Executive Officer of the Zimbabwe Stock Exchange testified that there 
had been “lots of hot money”, “rogue traders” and “fraudulent cheques” in the stock market (Gono 2008, 223). 
Similarly, discussing the bank cheque scam, also called ‘burning money’, the president of Bankers Association of 
Zimbabwe, currently governor of the central bank, pointed out that the cheque scam had “increase[d] credit 
creation when there is no asset that has been created and the results are very simple: it causes more inflation and 
indeed demand for cash” (Gono 2008, 224). This is the broader context within which hyperinflation became a 
literal inferno to the economy. The era 2002-2008 is a typical illustration of the problem of financialization of the 
economy (Palley, 2016). 
Greed, corruption, and market indiscipline characterized by diversion of central bank productive sector 
concessionary facilities to speculation in the stock market, real estate and parallel foreign currency markets became 
daily experience. These markets were both unassailable inflation hedges for speculators and inflation drivers in 
the economy resulting in exponential growth in money supply. The central bank charged that “cash barons and 
dealers [were] in the habit of creating mini-Central Banks in their homes and offices in competition with our core 
function” (RBZ MPS, Oct 2007, 21). This in turn led to “excessive non-productive growth rates in money supply” 
(RBZ MPS, 2004, 39), which in turn drove inflation. Severe cash crises between 2002 and 2004 were directly 
linked to “corporate incest” (Gono, 2008: 124) whereby commercial banks left their core business and started 
speculating with depositors’ funds in real estate assets as well as diverting depositors’ funds to stock market and 
parallel market currency trading.  
Existing scholarship on Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe monetary policy philosophy between 2003 and 2008 is 
generally silent about the market indiscipline that was rampant at the time a couple of years prior to that period. 
While acknowledging market indiscipline in the 2003-2008 period, they often do so dismissively and blaming the 
central bank for engineering it e.g. (Mpofu & Nyamadzawo, 2016; Shumbambiri, 2016). The economy was 
undergoing a colossal speculative bubble in the stock market, banking sector and the real estate market, 
significantly fueled by parallel foreign currency trade. The bubble began since the late 1990s. There was a casino 
economy ethic pervading the economy. Large volumes of unproductive cash were being churned out into the 
economy through speculative activities. The excessive growth of nominal money supply was driven by activities 
that bordered (or indeed were manifestations) money laundering (Fundira, 2007).  
The paper contributes to evolving scholarship on Zimbabwean hyperinflation in two ways. First, the paper 
looks at the parallel exchange rate-inflation-money supply-real estate price nexus. Existing scholarship has 
explored separately the exchange rate-inflation nexus, parallel exchange rate-inflation nexus and money supply-
inflation nexus. By not completing the chain of the dynamic interactions, the findings might be painting an 
incomplete picture. Second, despite data challenges, the paper incorporates the real estate sector into the analysis, 
which makes it the first paper to directly test Gono’s thesis. Sadly, Zimbabwe Stock Exchange at a quarterly 
frequency was not found: had it been, the circle would have been perfectly completed. Third, some of the papers 
have questionable empirical procedures, which make their results suspect. To give a few examples, Shumbambiri 
(2016) finds the money neutrality hypothesis to have held in Zimbabwe between 2000 and 2008 using residuals 
from a spurious regression to test for cointegration; Madesha, Chidoko, & Zivanomoyo (2013), while testing the 
link between official exchange rate and inflation, treat one of the variables as stationary after first difference when 
it is not. In this paper, we adopt an Autoregressive Distributed Lag modelling framework and performs 
cointegration analysis within that framework. This methodology is superior to single equation cointegration 
methods some of the papers use. 
 
1.3. Significance of the study 
Zimbabwe has relapsed into hyperinflation in a decade after the first hyperinflation episode of 2003-2008 despite 
ample lessons from her own economic history. The same markets that Gono blamed for irrational exuberance seem 
to remain dominant in the evolution of inflationary dynamics in Zimbabwe. Since scholarship has not empirically 
tested these claims the study fills a significant void in this regard. Filling this void is not only valid from an 
economic history point of view but also for informing policy in Zimbabwe. 
 
2. Empirical discourses 
Muñoz (2006), perhaps the first to study in detail Zimbabwean hyperinflation, explored the unusual divergence 
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between the evolution of real money balances and inflation, the latter showing a rapid decline while the former 
was increasing. ‘Conventional wisdom’, they argue, suggests a U-shape in the evolution of real money balances – 
declining first and then rising as stabilization progresses. They find it puzzling that inflation led rather than lagged 
changes in money supply aggregates. Muñoz’s (2006) findings point to suppressed inflation and measurement 
errors in the consumer price index, especially given outdated weights, which resulted in unusually high real money 
balances.  
Several concerns with Muñoz’s (2006) paper deserve to be mentioned. Firstly, the analysis assumed that there 
was monetary equilibrium, Ms = Md, in the 1998-2004 period. Yet, there was disequilibrium because there were 
widespread cash shortages since 2002 (Ms < Md), heightening in 2004, when the RBZ read the riot act to banks 
that had tied depositors’ moneys in illiquid real estate assets, stock market speculation and illegal foreign exchange 
dealings (Gono, 2008). Secondly, the problem of reverse causality is all the more inescapable in their analysis, 
especially between monetary aggregates and the parallel exchange rate as well as between monetary aggregates 
and real GPD, given that in 2004-2005 capacity utilization improved in some sectors following quasi-fiscal 
interventions. Thirdly, nowhere in the paper do they acknowledge the rampant problem of money laundering that 
was evolving in the quadrilateral relationship between the stock market, banking sector, real estate, and parallel 
foreign exchange market (Fundira, 2007; Gono, 2008). The rapid correction that followed several institutional 
reforms including banking sector corporate governance reforms and a return to core activities by the financial 
sector was a structural shock in the relationship between real money balances and inflation. Monetary policy had 
to be a double-edged sword: injecting the much-needed liquidity to the real sector (hence growth in real money 
balances), while correcting market indiscipline (thwarting speculative impulses on inflation, a major driver of 
inflation then). Thus, divergence of real money demand and inflation was inevitable. 
McIndoe-Calder (2018) also constructs a new price index based on the parallel exchange rate. Like Muñoz 
(2006), McIndoe-Calder (2018) finds growth in money supply to be the major driver of inflation. They dispute the 
narrative by the central bank that speculative price setting behavior played a key role in the evolution of the 
hyperinflationary episode in Zimbabwe. They find seigniorage revenue to have grown substantially in the post 
2000 period. Makochekanwa (2007a; 2007b) similarly finds money supply growth, parallel market exchange rate 
and inflation inertia to be major causes of hyperinflation. Others have invariably found excessive money supply 
growth to be the cause of hyperinflation (Hanke 2008; Hanke and Kwok 2009).  
Madesha et al. (2013) confirm the bi-directional causal relationship between official exchange rate and 
inflation in Zimbabwe, which must be even much stronger between parallel exchange rate and inflation. However, 
the results of their study are suspect, because they misinterpreted their unit root test results for the inflation variable. 
They concluded it was I(1) when, in fact, it was not stationary in first difference. The Johansen cointegrating 
methodology that followed, and the Granger causality results, therefore, were spurious at best. Nevertheless, it is 
established theoretically that there is always an “inflation-depreciation spiral” (Kararach & Otieno, 2016: 250), 
regardless of whether it is depreciation of the official or the parallel exchange rate. In fact, Kararach & Otieno 
(2016) found that changes in money supply granger-caused changes in the consumer price index which in turn 
granger-caused changes in the official nominal exchange rate. They also found that changes in the parallel nominal 
rate granger-caused changes in the official nominal exchange rate. Finding one cointegrating vector between 
nominal official exchange rate, relative money supply (Zim to US) and relative output (Zimbabwe to US), 
Kararach & Otieno (2016) estimated a VECM and found evidence of the overshooting phenomenon in the manner 
in which the exchange rate adjusted to its long run equilibrium, suggesting an unstable cointegrating relationship. 
Shumbambiri (2016) tests the RBZ maintained conviction that monetary policy was not neutral to growth, 
using quarterly data for the period 2000 to 2008. Using a single equation cointegration test they established that 
money supply and economic growth were not cointegrated on the one hand, and money supply and inflation on 
the other were cointegrated. This armed them to reject the non-neutrality of money that the RBZ maintained in the 
study period because no cointegration was established for economic growth and money supply. Further they find 
existence of bi-directional causality between money supply and inflation, which though defying the Quantity 
Theory of Money, they still use it to make the QTM prescription that to stop inflation the RBZ must stop expanding 
money supply. The QTM assumes unidirectional causality from money supply to inflation. However, their finding 
of neutrality of money is a red herring because the residuals to which they applied the single equation cointegration 
approach were generated from a spurious regression in which the DW statistic was a third of the R2.  
Ellyne & Daly (2013) explore the line that Zimbabwe’s deplorable monetary policy failure is explained by 
the Impossible Trinity Hypothesis. The central bank was trying to set both monetary policy and the exchange rate 
policy while allowing for capital mobility. They find the parallel exchange rate-inflation spiral to have been a 
dominant phenomenon in 1998-2008.  
Kairiza (2009) acknowledges supply-side shocks embodied in the fast track land reform, but goes on to single 
out political rent-seeking process that involved the ruling party ‘appeasing’ its angry support base with significant 
political rent transfers. These led to excessive growth in money supply. In light of this, Kairiza (2009, 1) disputes 
the genuineness of the expansionary monetary policy and charges that 
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The liquidity expansion by the central bank to prop the ruling party embodied in the quasi-fiscal activities 
veiled as expansionary Keynesian economics played a major role in firmly setting the stage for hyperinflation 
in the latter stages of the saga (emphasis added).  
Since, in Kairiza’s (2009) assessment, the policy target was neither full employment nor low and stable 
inflation, the policy was a ‘pseudo-Keynesian’ policy. Other scholars have pointed out that there has been, since 
political independence in 1980, a pattern of anti-developmental patrimonialism in Zimbabwe, with extensive ruling 
party networks of rent extraction from the financial, trade and productive sectors of the economy (Dawson & 
Kelsall, 2012). At the heart of hyperinflation were political and economic misgovernance, the battle for political 
survival. In this context, seigniorage revenue from the central bank was used to ring-fence political power, a point 
Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2015) emphasizes as the pillaging of the central bank in the era of Mugabeism. Part of the 
complex of factors that undermined monetary policy includes rent seeking activities associated with allocation of 
foreign currency, especially to state owned enterprises that invariably had become militarized and impossible for 
the RBZ to reprimand for non-delivery of the services for which they had been given preferential foreign currency 
allocation. It is reported that by 2008, at least 52 state-owned enterprises were governed by retired senior military 
officials who, in a zealot-like allegiance, were invariably members of the ruling party (Rupiya, 2011). The basis 
of the preferential access to foreign currency was because many of these local government authorities and state-
owned enterprises were crucial supply-side sources of inflationary shocks, especially those supplying fuel, 
electricity and cargo transport services (Gono, 2008). 
In short, the diagnoses, some of which I have reviewed here, identify the unconventional monetary policy 
stance of the central bank as the underlying cause of the Zimbabwean economic crisis, especially hyperinflation. 
Such unconventionality, they say, was not a genuine Keynesian monetary policy thrust, but a disguised looting 
strategy. 
 
3. Methods and data 
3.1 Empirical model 
Based on the articulation of the empiricised, theoretical or surmised relationships between inflation, real estate 
prices, parallel foreign exchange and money supply, the paper adopts a linear functional relationship: 
 = 	
 ,  ,        (1) 
LogCPIt is the natural logarithm of the consumer price index; logBMPIt is the natural log of the building 
materials price index (a proxy for real estate sector dynamics); logM3t is the natural logarithm of broad money 
supply; and logPERt is the natural logarithm of the parallel exchange rate. t is a time index. While the building 
materials price index is not the best of candidates, it is sufficient to demonstrate the role of real estate price 
dynamics on inflation. The weakness is that it does not fully capture the speculative component of the real estate 
market since it focuses on real estate input prices rather than final output prices. The latter would be more 
representative of the dynamics. Since banks and other players engaged in real estate investments as inflation hedges. 
Some moneys were tied in bricks, cement and other building materials (Gono, 2008). This means that the building 
materials price index is not entirely a misplaced proxy for real estate market dynamics. 
While several techniques for testing for the existence of long run relationships exist, the autoregressive 
distributed lag (ARDL) approach is generally regarded is the most efficient and reliable relative to the rest (Pesaran, 
2015). This approach is well suited to large and small samples alike: the order of integration and sample size are 
not pressing concerns. As a precautionary measure individual series unit root tests were carried out and are reported 
in Table 1. Variables were of mixed orders of integration. Given the small sample size, the ARDL test is most 
suitable. A bounds test for cointegration was employed. The test model is stated as follows:        
∆ =  +∑ ∆ + ∑ ∆ + ∑ ∆ + ∑ ∆

 +






 +  +  +  +  !""# + $(2) 
In equation 2, $ is a stochastic error term; ∆ is a difference operator. The summation upper limits are optimal 
lag lengths determined by information criteria – in this case, the Akaike Information Criterion, giving 
∆
4, 4, 1, 2. A dummy variable taking the value of one (1) for 2004Q1-2007Q2 and zero otherwise was 
introduced to differentiate the Gideon Gono governorship era from the Leonard Tsumba governorship era. In the 
interest of assessing the potential of reverse causality, equation 2 was repeated with each explanatory variable 
being treated as a dependent variable. The optimal lag lengths for the other three alternative specifications were: 
ARDL for ∆
2, 1, 4, 3; for ∆
4, 4, 1,1 and ∆
3, 0, 1, 4. To test for existence of a long 
run relationship between the dependent and explanatory variables, the null hypothesis tested is that  =  =
 =  = 0 against the alternative that  ≠  ≠  ≠  ≠ 0. The null hypothesis claims no existence of a long 
run relationship, but the alternative does. The bounds test fails to reject the null hypothesis if both the test statistic 
for the F and the t are less than lower critical bounds. The null hypothesis is rejected if the F and the t statistics 
exceed the upper critical bound. 
Failure to reject the null hypothesis implies that only the short-run model is estimated. If the null hypothesis 
is rejected, then a long run relationship exists. An error correction model is then modelled as follows: 
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∆ =  +∑ +∆ + ∑ +∆ + ∑ +∆ +∑ +∆

 +






 !""# + , + -        (3) 
The parameter of interest in equation 3 is , is the speed of adjustment to the long run. If the cointegration 
relationship is to be stable, convergent and non-spurious, this parameter must be negative and significant. 
Generally, , ∈ 
−1, 0 but if it is less than -1 literature tends to interpret that as an overcorrection of the short 
run divergence from the long run.  
 
3.2 Data and variables 
Data for this empirical paper was obtained from the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe’s pre-multicurrency regime 
economic statistics. The building materials price index was obtained from the Zimbabwe Statistical Agency. Data 
for the latter half of 2007 and 2008 was difficult to find for all variables. Were variables had different base years, 
conversion factors supplied by the Zimbabwe Statistical Agency were used to make the base year uniform and 
2008 was used as a base year. Data for the Zimbabwe Stock Exchange Index was not complete and not quarterly. 
So it was not included in the analysis. The data was measured at a quarterly frequency between 1998 and 2007: 
1998Q1-2007Q2. 
 
4. Statistical tests and findings 
4.1 Unit root test and Bounds test 
Table 1: Unit root tests 
Variable Augmented Dickey-Fuller Phillips-Peron 
 Levels First 
difference 
Second 
difference 
Levels First 
difference 
Second 
difference 
Log Consumer Price 
Index 
2.362(3) 1.726(3) -3.335**(3) 6.830 2.479 -3.237** 
Log Building 
Materials Price Index 
4.222(3) 0.721(3) -8.519***(3) 5.634 -2.939* -8.292*** 
Log Broad Money 
Supply (M3) 
2.960(2) 3.242(2) -0.862(2) 3.560 1.714 -5.230*** 
Log Parallel Exchange 
Rate 
2.438(2) -5.376***(2)  -3.188 -5.753***  
*** means p<0.01, ** means p<0.05, * means p<0.1; figures in brackets are optimal lag lengths selected by AIC. 
Log M3 had a significant trend component; the rest did not have significant trend components. 
Unit root tests presented in Table 1 show that variables are not integrated of the same order. The test equation 
included intercept (trend was insignificant) and the Akaike Information criteria suggested 3 lags for the ADF test 
equation for the log of building materials price index and the log consumer price index. For log of broad money 
(M3) and the log of parallel exchange rate, the AIC suggested 2 lags for the ADF test. Only the log of parallel 
exchange rate was integrated of order one at the 1% level of significance. The log of building materials price index 
and the log of consumer price index were integrated of order of two going by the ADF test. Log of M3 was not 
stationary even after second difference. We, however, retained it in the analysis given its centrality in the debates 
about hyperinflation dynamics in Zimbabwe. Using the Phillips-Peron test, the log of CPI, the log of BMPI and 
the log of M3 were integrated of order two, but the log of the parallel exchange rate was integrated of order one.  
Table 2: Bounds test for cointegration 
Model F Level of significance Lower bound Upper bound 
logBMPI (2, 1, 4, 3) 11.975*** 10% 
5% 
1% 
2.72 
3.23 
4.29 
3.77 
4.35 
5.61 
logCPI (4, 4, 1, 2) 14.748***    
logM3 (4, 4, 1, 1) 4.888**    
logPER (3, 0, 1, 4) 5.343**    
*** means p<0.01, ** means p<0.05, * means p<0.1 
The bounds test established four long run relationships: first, logBMPI = f(logCPI, logM3, logPER); second, 
logPER=f(logCPI, logM3, logBMPI); and third, logCPI = f(logM3, logBMPI, logPER) and fourth logM3 = 
f(logCPI, logBMPI, logPER). However, while a long run relationship in the logM3 = f(logCPI, logBMPI, logPER) 
existed, the ECM did not satisfy the negativity constraint on the speed of adjustment measure. Thus three error 
correction models were estimated and one short run equation, which we have not reported in the paper. 
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4.2 Empirical Results 
Table 3: Long run and short run regression results 
 ∆
4, 4, 1,2 ∆
2, 1, 4, 3 ∆
4, 4, 1, 1 ∆
3, 0, 1,4 
Intercept -6.409*** 
(0.762) 
-1.628*** 
(0.226) 
-0.617*** 
(0.116) 
-1.171*** 
(0.246) 
∆  -0.232* 
(0.125) 
-0.193 
(0.131) 
0.287** 
(0.128) 
3.169*** 
(0.390) 
∆ -0.100 
(0.111) 
   
∆ -0.086 
(0.113) 
   
∆ -0.385*** 
(0.105) 
   
∆   -0.059 
(0.139) 
0.264** 
(0.106) 
 
∆ 0.636*** 
(0.112) 
 1.017*** 
(0.148) 
 
∆ 0.217* 
(0.114) 
 -0.386** 
(0.148) 
 
∆ 0.457*** 
(0.112) 
 0.443*** 
(0.134) 
 
∆ 0.093 
(0.080) 
0.137 
(0.087) 
 -0.185 
(0.300) 
∆  -0.056 
(0.125) 
-0.752*** 
(0.154) 
0.188 
(0.325) 
∆  -0.024 
(0.095) 
-0.724*** 
(0.197) 
0.717* 
(0.385) 
∆  -0.598*** 
(0.139) 
0.652*** 
(0.164) 
1.816** 
(0.734) 
∆ 0.091* 
(0.044) 
0.224*** 
(0.029) 
0.025 
(0.042) 
 
∆ 0.152*** 
(0.042) 
-0.130** 
(0.050) 
 0.421** 
(0.183) 
∆  -0.160*** 
(0.035) 
 0.530*** 
(0.159) 
D04Q1-07Q2 -0.077*** 
(0.022) 
0.023 
(0.027) 
-0.309*** 
(0.068) 
-0.061 
(0.103) 
  -1.059*** 
(0.126) 
-0.295*** 
(0.039) 
0.031*** 
(0.006) 
-1.279*** 
(0.257) 
R2 = 
F = 
Jarque-Bera = 
Breusch-
Godfrey LM = 
0.976 
65.36 (p<0.01) 
2.506 (p = 0.286) 
3.301 (p=0.069) 
0.973 
64.5 (p<0.01) 
0.26 (p=0.878) 
4.174 (p=0.124) 
0.966 
51.89 (p<0.01) 
1.971 (p=0.373) 
2.367 (p=0.124) 
0.919 
27.86 (p<0.01) 
2.004 (p=0.367) 
3.389 (p=0.184) 
The purpose of this study was to test the claim by the then governor of the central bank, Gideon Gono, who 
presided over the worst hyperinflation that inflation was driven by speculative activity in the real estate market 
and parallel foreign exchange market. The prism would have been complete had data for the stock exchange been 
found. Three error correction mechanisms with desirable properties for the error correction term – negative and 
statistically significant – were found (Table 3).  
In the case of the regression for ∆  (Table 3) shocks in the building materials price index, parallel 
market exchange rate and money supply would cause inflation to diverge from its equilibrium path. The results 
suggest that a 1.06% of the disparity between the short run and the long run values for logCPI in the previous 
quarter would be corrected in current quarter. This means that there is an overcorrection of the equilibrium error 
by 0.06%. The speed of adjustment is almost unity which suggests instantaneous inflation adjustment to long run 
equilibrium, with a little noise that causes overcorrection. We observe a very strong element of inertia in the 
evolution of inflation dynamics. The cumulative effect of inflation for the previous three quarters, on average, is 
approximately 1.3% increase in current price level dynamics, ceteris paribus. News about an increase in inflation, 
takes longer to die out in the economy: prolonged lagged effects. Perhaps, this suggests a presence of adverse 
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adaptive inflation expectations in the economy. All the coefficients of the parallel exchange rate are positive 
suggesting that this economic price was a significant source of inflationary pressure. Unfortunately, all the short 
run coefficients of the building material price index are negative. One would have expected these coefficients to 
be positive. The dummy variable shows that the inflation rate was 7.4% lower than it was in the pre Gono era in 
the study period. The model was adequate. It is structurally stable according to the CUSUM and CUSUMSQ tests 
(see Figure 2). The residuals are normally distributed. There is some evidence of serial correlation at the 10% level 
of significance. 
In the case of the regression for ∆  (Table 3), about 29.5% of the wedge between the short run and 
long run values of logBMPI in the previous quarter, following a shock in the other variables, is corrected in the 
current quarter. The effect of parallel exchange rate on the BMPI is mixed. The current quarter parallel exchange 
rate has a positive effect on the building materials price index, but the effects of the parallel exchange rate in the 
previous two quarters are negative. Perhaps, this can be explained by the role foreign exchange trading is an 
alternative way of storing and growing value just as speculative investing in the real estate is. A speculator holds 
a portfolio of assets among which are foreign exchange and real estate assets. Perhaps, this suggests that the more 
resources were poured into foreign currency trading, the less was available for real estate investment. This then 
dampens demand for building materials. It is worth noting that the parallel exchange rate is a very influential 
variable in the short run, judging by the absolute sizes of its coefficients. The model was adequate. It is structurally 
stable according to the CUSUM and CUSUMSQ tests (see Figure 3). The residuals are normally distributed. 
In the case of the regression for ∆  (Table 3), the parallel exchange rate has a significant inertia 
mechanism governing its evolution over time. This means that the rate is path dependent in its evolutionary 
dynamics and is generally sticky downwards. In the short run, however, the building materials index has the 
greatest effect on the parallel exchange rate: a 1% increase in the BMPI leads to just over 3% depreciation in the 
parallel exchange rate. Gono’s argument of a casino inferno brewing between the real estate and parallel exchange 
rate seems confirmed here. The transmission mechanism as we perceive it was that once real estate prices started 
increasing, given real estate investments were used as inflation hedges, there was a greater likelihood that demand 
for foreign currency to acquire properties might end up pushing up the parallel exchange rate. This means that 
people dump Zimbabwean dollars into the market and mop foreign currency. This leads to the depreciation of the 
Zimbabwean dollar. Similarly, the short run coefficients for broad money supply show that expansionary monetary 
policy induced significant parallel exchange rate depreciation. For example, the cumulative effect of expansionary 
monetary stances in the previous second and third quarters would lead to a 2.5% depreciation of the parallel 
exchange rate, all else being equal. This suggests that the parallel exchange rate was quite responsive to growth in 
money supply. The model is structurally stable according to the CUSUM and CUSUMSQ tests (see Figure 5). The 
residuals are normally distributed. 
In the case of the regression for ∆ (Table 3), a short run relationship (not reported here was estimated). 
Setting aside the speed of adjustment multiplier which is very small and positive, the rest of the coefficients in the 
regression make economic sense. Interestingly, coefficients of lagged differenced broad money are mostly 
negative. This suggests that a constant effort to mop excess liquidity from the market. Since inflation remained 
number one enemy of the central bank, but several quasi-fiscal interventions were carried out, it makes sense that 
efforts to mop up liquidity would follow an initial surge in liquidity through open market operations. In addition 
several quasi-fiscal interventions repayment dates staggered which means there was a semi-automatic liquidity 
correction mechanism as repayment dates approached. Thus, the cumulative effect for three previous quarters was 
roughly a 0.8% decrease in money supply. We note that money supply was relatively elastic to increases in 
inflation. For example the net effect of the inflation changes in the previous three quarters would lead to a 1.07% 
increase in nominal broad money. The rate of money growth was about 26.6% lower in the Gono era than it was 
in the Tsumba era, other things being equal. The model has good diagnostics. Coefficients are stable and the model 
does not suffer serial correlation. Similarly, the residuals of the model do not violate the normality assumption. 
In terms of Granger causality tests (Table 4), our findings suggest that there is bidirectional causality between 
logBMPI and logM3. This bidirectional causality confirms Gono’s argument that speculation in the real estate 
market and other inflation-hedging markets induced monetary growth through the credit creation process as well 
as money laundering activities of the form of shadow printing of money such as the cheque scam (Fundira, 2007; 
Gono, 2008). A bidirectional causality was also found between the CPI and M3, which others have also found 
(Shumbambiri, 2016). This finding is closest to confirming the claims of the trilateral relationship amongst these 
variables. Unidirectional causality from parallel exchange rate to inflation was observed. Also a unidirectional 
causal effect from building materials price index to money supply growth. This result is also closer to confirming 
the governor’s hunch, although it does not tell us if the effect is positive or negative. We also found unidirectional 
causality from money supply growth to the parallel exchange rate. This result confirms anecdotes such as ‘the 
Reserve was printing money to source foreign currency on the parallel market’. The Granger causality results are 
broadly consistent with the ARDL results. 
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4.3. Coefficient diagnostics 
 
Figure 2: CUSUM test for ∆  
 
Figure 3: CUSUM test for ∆  
 
Figure 4: CUSUM test for ∆  
 
 
Figure 5: CUSUM test for ∆ 
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Table 4: Granger Causality results at 2 lags 
Null hypothesis Observations  F-Statistics P-value 
logBMPI does not granger cause logCPI 
logCPI does not granger cause logBMPI 
36  19.392 
1.164 
0.000 
0.325 
LogM3 does not granger cause logCPI 
logCPI does not granger cause logM3 
36  24.552 
9.852 
0.000 
0.001 
logPER does not granger cause logCPI 
logCPI does not granger cause logPER 
34  3.842 
0.795 
0.033 
0.461 
logM3 does not granger cause logBMPI 
logBMPI does not granger cause logM3 
36  3.432 
19.342 
0.045 
0.000 
logPER does not granger cause logBMPI 
logBMPI does not granger cause logPER 
34  0.061 
1.446 
0.941 
0.252 
logPER does not granger cause logM3 
logM3 does not granger cause logPER 
34  2.116 
4.802 
0.139 
0.016 
 
5. Conclusion 
With the caveat that our study face data availability and quality constraints, the study draws several conclusions. 
The paper has shed more light to what seems to have been marginalized in the discourses about the evolution of 
hyperinflation in Zimbabwe. First, the bidirectional relationship between the building materials price index and 
broad money, confirms the governor’s claim that real estate dynamics, in cohorts with the banking sector, played 
a significant role in the shadow printing of money. Second, the existence of causality running from real estate price 
dynamics to consumer price index complements the first point. Third, the bidirectional causality between the 
consumer price index and money supply suggests a money supply-inflation spiral that cannot be explained with 
the Quantity Theory of Money approach. Fourth, the existence of long run relationships among the variables and 
convergent error correction mechanism within an ARDL framework sheds better light than existing unit root based 
approaches to establish cointegration. These findings are very important because the same trilateral relationship 
between the Zimbabwe Stock Exchange, parallel foreign exchange market and real estate market seem to continue 
to play a dominant role, in addition to monetary indiscipline, in the evolution of inflation dynamics in Zimbabwe. 
Currency manipulation by government sets the economy on a casino economy path in which unhealthy speculation 
in the three markets because the only way to preserve financial value. Once this casino is set in motion it hard to 
reverse and for this reason a permanent solution remains monetary reforms that include ways of ring-fencing the 
central bank from political rent extraction. The policy lesson from this paper is for government to manage 
expectations given the significance of adverse adaptive inflation expectations in Zimbabwe. Focusing on export 
performance and allowing interbank determination of exchange rates could be initial steps towards a sound 
currency. 
 
References 
Chitiga, M., & Mabugu, R. (2008). Evaluating the impact of land redistribution: A CGE microsimulation 
application to Zimbabwe. Journal of African Economies, 17(4), 527-549.  
Dawson, M., & Kelsall, T. (2012). Anti-developmental patrimonialism in Zimbabwe. Journal of Contemporary 
African Studies, 30(1), 49-66.  
Ellyne, M., & Daly, M. (2013). Zimbabwe monetary policy 1998-2012: From hyperinflation to Dollarization1. 
Economic Management Under Hyperinflationary Environment: Lessons from Zimbabwe .Oxford University 
Press, 249-289. 
Fundira, B. (2007). Money laundering in Zimbabwe, 2004 to 2006. Confronting the Proceeds of Crime in Southern 
Africa: An Introspection. ISS Monograph Series, (132), 47-72.  
Gono, G. (2008). Zimbabwe's casino economy: Extraordinary measures for extraordinary challenges ZPh 
Publishers. 
Gukurume, S. (2010). The politics of money burning and foreign currency exchange in Zimbabwe: A case study 
of Mucheke residents in Masvingo. Journal of Sustainable Development in Africa, 12(6), 62-73.  
Gukurume, S. (2015). Livelihood resilience in a hyperinflationary environment: Experiences of people engaging 
in money-burning (kubhena mari) transactions in Harare, Zimbabwe. Social Dynamics, 41(2), 219-234. 
doi:10.1080/02533952.2015.1069492 
Kairiza, T. (2009). Unbundling Zimbabwe’s journey to hyperinflation and official dollarization. 
Natl.Grad.Inst.Policy Stud.GRIPS, , 9.  
Kararach, G., & Otieno, R. O. (2016). Economic management in a hyperinflationary environment: The political 
economy of Zimbabwe, 1980-2008 Oxford University Press. 
Kiguel, M. A., Lizondo, J. S., & O'Connell, S. A. (1997). Parallel exchange rates in developing countries Springer. 
Madesha, W., Chidoko, C., & Zivanomoyo, J. (2013). Empirical test of the relationship between exchange rate 
Journal of Economics and Sustainable Development                                                                                                                        www.iiste.org 
ISSN 2222-1700 (Paper) ISSN 2222-2855 (Online)  
Vol.11, No.10, 2020 
 
130 
and inflation in Zimbabwe. Journal of Economics and Sustainable Development, 4(1), 52-58.  
Makochekanwa, A. (2007a). A dynamic enquiry into the causes of hyperinflation in Zimbabwe. Transport, 9, 8.  
Makochekanwa, A. (2007b). Zimbabwe’s black market for foreign exchange. Journal of Economics, 98(1), 25-40.  
Mawowa, S., & Matongo, A. (2010). Inside Zimbabwe’s roadside currency trade: The ‘World bank’ of Bulawayo. 
Journal of Southern African Studies, 36(2), 319-337.  
McIndoe-Calder, T. (2018). Hyperinflation in Zimbabwe: Money demand, seigniorage and aid shocks. Applied 
Economics, 50(15), 1659-1675.  
Mpofu, S., & Nyamadzawo, J. (2016). Operations, regulation, and practices of the Zimbabwe stock exchange 
during the hyperinflationary period, 2000–08. Economic Management in a Hyperinflationary Environment: 
The Political Economy of Zimbabwe, 1980-2008, , 157-198.  
Muñoz, M. S. (2007). Central bank quasi-fiscal losses and high inflation in Zimbabwe: A note International 
Monetary Fund. 
Muñoz, S. (2006). Suppressed inflation and money demand in Zimbabwe International Monetary Fund. 
Ndlovu-Gatsheni, S. J. (2015). Mugabeism?: History, politics, and power in Zimbabwe Springer. 
Noko, J. (2011). Dollarization: The case of Zimbabwe. Cato J., 31, 339.  
Palley, T. (2016). Financialization: The economics of finance capital domination Springer. 
Pesaran, M.H. (2015). Time series and panel data econometrics Oxford University Press 
Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe. (2007). Monetary Policy Statement. Government of Zimbabwe. 
Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe. (2004). Monetary Policy Statement. Government of Zimbabwe. 
Rupiya, M. (2011). The military factor in Zimbabwe’s political and electoral affairs. 
Sachikonye, L. M. (2003). From ‘growth with equity’ to ‘fast-track’ reform: Zimbabwe's land question. Review of 
African Political Economy, 30(96), 227-240.  
Shumbambiri, G. (2016). Monetary policy formulation and implementation in a hyperinflationary environment. 
Economic Management in a Hyperinflationary Environment: The Political Economy of Zimbabwe, 1980-
2008, , 336-378.  
Tembo, J. (2016). Bank failures in Zimbabwe. Economic Management in a Hyperinflationary Environment: The 
Political Economy of Zimbabwe, 1980-2008, , 139-156. 
 
 
 
 
  
